




"For me, the reading of novels has been my only access to
certain truths." (p. 174)
Keneally produced the novel and document on which the
movie on Oskar Schindler was based. Oskar is a man for whom
life is in the service of desire, of passions, of a process of
self-transformation, but in the end he uses that very process
to save the lives of others, to ensure their survival. Oskar
Schindler is a man with a surfeit of abundance. He is a
monster of energy which is turned toward the salvation of a
remnant of Jews from the steamroller of Nazi evil. To what
extent is Keneally's account a fabrication, and to what extent
does the novel capture the reality of the Holocaust and the
character of Schindler? Is Oskar in the novel a historical
witness of what occurred, and is he himself rooted in his own
history?
Yosef Yerushalmi claimed that the novel was forging the
image of the Holocaust rather than historiography. "The
Holocaust has already engendered more historical research than
any single event in Jewish history, but I have no doubt that
its image is being shaped, not at the historian's anvil, but
in the novelist's crucible."1 However, critics acclaimed
Keneally for being an excellent documentalist and upholding
the principles of an historian or a good journalist even
though the story was told in the form of a novel. "The joint
testimony of these survivors has been tirelessly researched,
skilfully assembled, scrupulously checked."2 In the opening
author's note, Keneally himself denies that he is writing
fiction, and concludes that in his novel, "Oskar Schindler's
astonishing history (my italics) appears for the first time in
extended form." (p. 11)
You can't call Schindler's List fiction any more
than you can call In Cold Blood, or The
Executioner's Song, or The Right Stuff fiction. I do
see that all of these books are in the fiction
section of the bookstore for convenience sake, and
also because they have these literary qualities. I
think the device of the documentary novel is well
established in North America and there are a number
of precedents for what I did.3
Anatoli Kuznetsov's Babi Yar, written as a document in
the form of a novel, was one such precedent. As Kuznetsov
himself said in an interview, "The result is not a novel in
the conventional sense, but a photographically accurate
picture of actual events."4  Oral testimony and documentary
evidence were turned into a literary version of a photograph,
"for the photograph operates rhetorically on precisely the
same assumption at work in documentary narrative. That is, as
a seeming trace or fragment of its referent that appeals to
the eye for proof, the photograph is able to invoke the
authority of its empirical link to events, which in turn seems
to reinforce the sense of its own unmediated factuality."5
The fictional technique was merely the convenient form.
Keneally, in fact, was upset when he received the Booker
prize, not for the prize itself, but because it was awarded
under the category of fiction. He claimed to be writing the
truth, an honest portrayal of the Holocaust itself and an
honest account of Schindler's heroic act of salvation using
the form of the novel.
The novel not only claims to represent historical truth,
it begins with a personal historical note which attributes the
origins of the novel to a tale told by another person at a
particular time and place - Leopold Pfefferberg. Keneally
attests that he is not the author of the tale. He based his
story on the testimony of witnesses. Keneally claims that he
is only responsible for rendering the aesthetic form he gives
to the material, but the truth of the content derives from the
original tellers of the tale.6 Is this claim valid?
Certainly, the feel of what happened is accurately
portrayed. Names, dates, the integration of the anecdotes of
witnesses into a continuous story, these are the documentary
techniques that the novel employs to convey the feel of the
time. The novel provides a powerful portrayal of the sense and
emotional impact of the Holocaust. "Schindler's List reads
like a novel: Its voices are thick with living tissue; its
scenes are so vivid they appear to result from a kind of
ventriloquism."7 "His narrative 'feels' true: it is
consistent, it makes sense, it carries its own conviction."8
To test the verity of Keneally's depiction of the
Holocaust, I want to examine examples of his description of
evidence of Holocaust events, what he himself says about the
Holocaust, how he explains it, and the frame within which he
seeks to understand it.
The burning of the synagogue in Krakow is the first scene
of actual genocide depicted in the novel. After describing the
SS smashing doors and stealing valuables, tearing a fur coat
off a girl by breaking her arm when she resisted, and shooting
a boy who refused to give up his skis, the scene shifts to the
synagogue.
"While the SS were working the apartment buildings,
the Einsatzgruppe squad moved against the
fourteenth-century synagogue of Stara Bozníca. As
they expected, they found at prayer there a
congregation of traditional Jews with beards and
sidelocks and prayer shawls. They collected a number
of the less Orthodox from surrounding apartments and
drove them in as well, as if they wanted to measure
the reaction of one group to the other.
"Among those pushed across the threshold of Stara
Bozníca was the gangster Max Redlicht, who would not
otherwise have entered an ancient temple or been
invited to do so. They stood in front of the Ark,
these two poles of the same tribe who would on a
normal day have found each other's company
offensive. An Einsatz NCO opened the Ark and took
out the parchment Torah scroll. The disparate
congregation on the synagogue floor were to file
past and spit on it. There was to be no faking - the
spittle was to be visible on the calligraphy.
"The Orthodox Jews were more rational about it than
those others, the agnostics, the liberals, the self-
styled Europeans. It was apparent to the Einsatz men
that the modern ones balked in front of the scroll
and even tried to catch their eye as if to say, Come
on, we're all too sophisticated for this nonsense.
The SS men had been told in their training that the
European character of liberal Jews was a tissue-thin
facade, and in Stara Bozníca the backsliding
reluctance of the ones who wore short haircuts and
contemporary clothes went to prove it.
"Everyone spat in the end except Max Redlicht. The
Einsatzgruppen men may have seen this as a test
worth their time - to make a man who visibly does
not believe renounce with spittle a book he views
intellectually as antique tribal drivel but which
his blood tells him is still sacred. Could a Jew be
retrieved from the persuasions of his ridiculous
blood? Could he think as cleverly as Kant? That was
the test.
"Redlicht did not pass it. He made a little speech.
'I've done a lot. But I won't do that.' They shot
him first, and then shot the rest anyway and set
fire to the place, making a shell of the oldest of
all Polish synagogues." (pp. 60-1)9
One does not have to be intimately acquainted with Polish
Jewry to find problems with this account. Why could a gangster
not attend any synagogue, orthodox or otherwise? Any Jew -
gangster or not - is welcome to join a minyan.10 Further, why
would orthodox and not-so orthodox or even liberal Jews have
found each others company offensive? And how many, if any,
liberal Jews or atheistic Jews would have regarded the Tanach
as antique tribal drivel?11 The lack of forelocks and wearing
of modern dress were not signs of the beliefs of modern Jews.
Being an atheist did not entail regarding the Torah as either
antique or tribal let alone drivel.
Though the latter point may have only been the
perspective of the Einsatzgruppen that Keneally was
reflecting, the text is ambiguous. But the statement that a
gangster would not have been invited to enter a synagogue or
that liberals and orthodox were two poles of the same tribe
who found each others company offensive is more clearly
Keneally's interpretation. Keneally cannot be accused of using
words loosely and unthinkingly. He is an excellent prose
stylist and a very economical writer who demonstrates a poet's
precision and close attention in his choice of words, and a
great sensitivity to their meaning. Why does Keneally say
these things about the Jews?
The interpretation is not only questionable, it is
unknowable. Keneally could not possibly know the attitude of
the Jews to each other or to the Tanach since all the Jews in
the synagogue were killed. Even if Keneally happened to have
access to Einsatzgruppen archives, they would be self-
evidently unreliable in reporting only what confirmed Nazi
prior beliefs.
Keneally claimed that he only used dialogue where he had
testimonial or documentary support from Schindler files. "I
didn't even use dialogue unless I had testimonial backing for
using it, from documents that Schindler had left behind him,
or from live testimony from former prisoners."12 No Jews
survived the torching of the synagogue to give evidence or
testimony. Oskar was not there. Archives would not have
provided such information. However, the issue is not whether
the Einsatzgruppen characterized the Torah as primitive drivel
rather than the Jews, or even the attitudes of liberal Jews,
but, assuming even that the liberal Jews shared that attitude
and Keneally found such views expressed in archives, why would
Keneally appear to confirm their beliefs in explicit words as
well as in his description of the scene? Keneally creates a
powerful scene which seems to verify the Einsatzgruppen
conviction that race runs deeper than education. Why would he
do this? It is one thing to tell the story of the burning of
the synagogue to confirm that Oscar knew about such planned
events, but why present the possible SS view as if it were, at
least in part, his own?
Look at the story again. It becomes not so much a tale
about the burning of the synagogue as the story of SS beliefs
and the behaviour of Jews confirming such beliefs. Further,
the story seems to confirm the hypocrisy of most liberal Jews.
If atheistic Jews believed that the Torah scrolls were antique
tribal drivel, why would they refuse or even hesitate to spit
on it if they were under a brutal threat if they refused? And
why would the ultra-orthodox be "more rational" and do so
readily? Both liberal and orthodox Jews knew that survival was
a higher value in God's eyes than spitting on the Torah under
threat of death, though presumably both groups might hesitate
to spit. In any case, why would the differential behaviour of
the two groups be depicted and then contrasted in their
behaviour to confirm the Einsatz belief that the Jewish racial
blood memory of the sacred Torah was at odds with their
intellectual convictions? Finally, assuming the legend of Max
Redlicht had been passed down by Jews, why would the legend
not be used to illustrate the courage of even a Jewish
gangster who would stand up to Nazis even when they ordered
him to spit on the Torah? Why is the story told to illustrate
that tradition, if not blood, runs much deeper than
intellectual beliefs?
This is not really even an issue of history, but the use
of legend for historiographical purposes. And the purpose does
not seem to be aimed at putting forth a Jewish view of the
Holocaust which might have represented the criminal atheist
Max as a tzaddic (a righteous person).13 Keneally offers a
version of a tale which not only has no basis in documentary
facts, is implausible given what is known about Jewish
behaviour at the time, seems to endorse Nazi rather than
Jewish mythology, but could not even be based on historical
documentary fact. Is it possible that Keneally buys into the
Nazi metaphysical view of the world -- not Nazi racism and
anti-semitism -- but the celebration of natural chance rather
than the Hebraic spiritual tradition or the Greek philosophic
tradition of human rationality?14
On the other hand, the story does attempt to document
something about Schindler even if it is only a particular
version of a legend about the Holocaust. Keneally's Schindler
is clearly portrayed not only as knowing about the Nazi
brutality that surrounded him, but of warning the Jews of
planned violent actions. In the novel, Schindler is clearly
acquainted with Nazi violence from the very beginning. One
commentator, in describing Schindler's reaction to the
clearing of the ghetto which occurred much later than the
burning of the synagogue, erroneously noted:
Apparently this incident, seen from a distance, was
Schindler's first experience of violence. Strangely,
Keneally's Schindler, moving freely about Nazi-
occupied Cracow, had managed not to see the
brutality that was everywhere. The thousands of
arrests, the public executions, the beatings, the
evictions. The succession of roundups of people
leaving churches after Mass, the many 'bloody
Sundays,' the attempts at 'returning' Cracow to the
status of a 'pure German' city are ignored in
Keneally's book.15
The clearing of the ghetto was not Schindler's first
knowledge of violence, though it may have been his first
direct encounter with that violence. The critic's main point
is that there has been a selection of events in the portrait
of the Holocaust. For example, the suffering of the Poles and
the Christians was omitted in the novel. The fact that the
Polish underground was large and active from 1939 is left
entirely out of the novel.16 The critics were right in this
regard; there is historical selectivity in dealing with the
Holocaust as background to the Oskar Schindler story. But is
that selectivity significant?
The main problem is not distortions caused by selective
representation. That is bound to happen in any relatively
concise document, especially when the material is not germane
to the story of Oscar Schindler. The real issue is how
Keneally provides such interpretive descriptions (the burning
of the Kracow synagogue), what he says about what he
describes, how he explains it, and the intellectual frame in
which he places the Holocaust.
Keneally characterized the Holocaust and connected it to
Schindler's actions as follows: "his salvage of a cross
section of a condemned race during those years now known by
the generic name Holocaust." (my italics) Oskar Schindler's
action is described as a salvage operation. Though certainly
his act saved people from extraordinary danger, we normally
salvage ships about to be wrecked or goods from ships about to
sink. We do not ordinarily write about people as salvage.
Saving them, bringing salvation if some religious overtone is
intended - but why the word 'salvage' applied to the Jews?17
Further, why are the Jews referred to as a 'race' when
the very idea that Jews are a race, that is, a group with the
same genetic inheritance, has been rejected by Jews as
applying to themselves. Jews are an ethnic group, a nation,
adhere to the same religion, share common cultural features -
whatever equivocal designation one prefers, but not a race.
Why does Keneally depict Jews by the very characterization
attributed to them by their greatest assassin?
And why condemned? The answer seems immediately obvious -
condemned by Hitler. Condemned by Himmler. Condemned by
Heydrich. Condemned by the entire Nazi murder machine. But
condemnation suggests blame. Condemnation suggests guilt.
Condemnation suggests that the party condemned is in the
wrong. This word is not only associated with those sentenced
to prison or death, or, what is worse, condemned, as in a
building no longer considered useful. 'Condemned' has a
psychological, moral and theological side as well as a
descriptive one.
The use of 'salvage' (as if the Jews were things) and the
use of 'condemned race' (which adopts the language of the
murderers), may be just a questionable choice of phrase.
However, the choice appears significant when a third part of
the same clause is examined - the phrase 'those years now
known by the generic name Holocaust'. Since when is the
Holocaust a measurement of a time span? And why is it a
'generic' term when the use of the word with capitals was to
characterize the specific attempt to exterminate the Jews and
the murder of six million of them as a unique event? The
generic term simply means a great loss of life by fire, or
"the word holocaust, shorn of its particular reference along
with its article, threatens to become a symbolic word
connoting mass murder and destruction whatever the
magnitude."18 Prior to the Second World War, holocaust referred
to a burnt offering as practised by the ancient Israelites, a
use now restricted to historical specialists. Why would
Keneally refer to the years, rather than the extermination of
the Jews, as the Holocaust, and then call it a generic name as
if it were a generic drug rather than one advertised by means
of a name that had been culturally copyrighted?
Keneally seems to be suggesting that the Holocaust was
not the Holocaust but a holocaust. This is certainly the
impression of Philip Marchand who interviewed Thomas Keneally.
"Keneally insists that the events recorded in Schindler's List
be linked in spirit with these atrocities (the Armenian
genocide, Stalin's treatment of the Ukrainians) as well. There
is no metaphysical uniqueness to the Holocaust which should
prevent it from being mentioned in the same breath with other
examples of genocide."19 What Keneally grants with the
capitalization, he takes away with the modifier.
Keneally treats the people who provided the testimonials
for his novel, and to whom he offers profuse thanks, as
objects, as salvage. He characterizes them in terms of their
physical traits and their membership in a collectivity
described in terms of 'race' using the language of the
murderers who wanted to kill them. He then depicts the
historical event from which they were saved as something both
generic and unique, but unique only insofar a reference to a
specific time period is unique.
Keneally goes further than merely describing events in a
way that has no documentary foundation and characterizing the
Holocaust in very questionable ways; he provides his own
potted historical explanation of the Holocaust in general.
Keneally claims that the final solution to the elimination of
the Jews from Europe through mass extermination by means of
gas was the result of a technological innovation - "a
disinfectant compound, Zyklon B20, would supplant Madagascar as
the solution." (p. 69) No respectable historian of the
Holocaust attributes the final solution to a technological
innovation. First, other gases like carbon monoxide were used
at other extermination camps, such as Belzec, Sobibór and
Treblinka. Secondly, the bulk of the initial victims of Zyklon
B were not Jewish; they were Soviet POWs. "Nor is there any
reliable evidence to suggest that these killings were
rehearsals for the subsequent mass gassing of Jews."21 Finally,
although Zyklon B allowed for a more effective means of mass
killing on the scale of Auschwitz, it was not the critical
factor replacing Madagascar as the solution. Ideological,
political, economic, military and practical factors were all
far more significant. For example, the beginning of the German
war with the USSR is the critical factor eliminating
Madagascar as a solution, as Keneally himself acknowledged.
Though this is a problem of historical inaccuracy, I am
more interested in the fact that Keneally points to a
technical innovation as the explanation for the mass
extermination of the Jews. Attributing the cause of the
Holocaust to Zyklon B gas is such an egregious error that some
account must be given of it. I suggest that the explanation
can be found in Keneally's own pragmatic orientation.
Pragmatism stresses not only the importance, but the leading
role of practical activities on human affairs, so that new
developments are determined not only by their practicality in
solving a problem, but the practicality of a new development
in deciding a problem is often the decisive factor in creating
a new development. Of course, pragmatists do not only believe
that thinking is a response to a concrete situation aimed at
solving a problem, and that such practical solutions make the
critical difference in human conduct.22
In Keneally's own pragmatism, and in his projection of
the emphasis of the critical role of technology in historical
change associated with pragmatism, Keneally commits serious
historical factual errors. But these are less important than
his peculiar characterizations. These cannot be connected with
his pragmatic outlook - the description of Oskar as a salvager
of a cross section of a condemned race, the description of
Stern as having inherited characteristics of his race (which I
had not alluded to heretofore), the description of the
Holocaust itself as an historical period.
Keneally creates a powerful scene which seems to confirm
the Einsatzgruppen conviction that race runs deeper than
education. Keneally, in the rare moments when he ventures
superficially into the thought side of his characters, seems
to be projecting his own world-view onto them. These problems
are not linked to Keneally's pragmatism, but are due to the
other side of his dialectical analysis, attributing behaviour
to inherited characteristics. They are connected with
explaining Oskar's behaviour in terms of an inborn daimon
which I will expand on later.23
This trait does not appear to fit in with Keneally as a
pragmatist, for pragmatists who follow in the Dewey mold are
non-theistic humanistic believers in a universal civil
religion.24 Experience counts, not inherited cultural or even
racial characteristics. But there is another side to Keneally.
He depicts Oskar Schindler as Janus-faced. But Thomas Keneally
also emerges as Janus-faced. Keneally seems to hold a doctrine
of inherited characteristics, inherited as an individual and
as a member of a group. This is not racism in any sense of
prejudice. Keneally is clearly not endorsing Nazi actions. But
his outlook is related to the Nazi world view.
Connected with the dichotomy between pragmatism and the
classical view of inherited characteristics and personality
traits is another dichotomy - the tension between feelings and
thought.
Keneally appears to sympathize with the view that liberal
members of the enlightenment had feelings which were
sentimentally attached to their past (their inherited daimon)
while their intellectual convictions were based on entirely
different premises and looked towards the future (their
pragmatism). Keneally endorses first those liberals, who, like
Stern, combined their liberal enlightened attitudes with a
commitment to his people rather than their Book. He does not
approve of those whose sentiments are out of synch with their
thoughts, but who make no effort to integrate the two. Even
the orthodox, who have a much more coherent value set, are
superior in this regard. For Keneally, rationality entailed
integrating one's thoughts and feelings.
His description of Schindler's behaviour is an
illustration. Chapter 5 in Keneally's novel demonstrates even
more explicitly that Oskar Schindler's sympathies were not
with the Nazi goal of eliminating the Jews, but with the Jews
themselves. The dilemma for him was how to make Oskar's
thoughts and actions conform to his feelings. Secondly, Oskar
comes across as an unequivocal communitarian pragmatist25 as he
shares his anti-Nazi sentiments with his German officer pals
drawn from the lesser ranks as they listen to music in a
cellar jazz club together, where the SS and Party officials
were most unlikely to appear given the Nazi conviction that
jazz was the expression of subhuman animals.
Some of Oskar Schindler's friends came from Canaris. "To
the SS the enemy within might be the Jew, but to the Canaris
the enemy within was the SS." (p. 65)26 None of the friends in
the jazz club were abominators of Jews. Keneally is explicitly
clear that Schindler belonged to a community of Germans who
opposed Hitler's policy of extermination. Schindler belonged
to a community of pragmatists who were anti-Nazi. Schindler
also had feelings of sympathy for the Jews.
Oskar Schindler went one step further in this
identification. He communicated with a number of dissident
factions, particularly the Zionist underground, to transfer
funds and transmit information back. Further, like many Jewish
survivors, for whom testimony became the sole reason to
survive, Oskar also wanted to serve as a witness to what had
ocurred. After the first Aktion in the ghetto: (7000 had been
cleared out) "Oskar had now become more exact about this sort
of information. He knew, for example, that the Aktion had been
under the overall management of one Wilhelm Kunde but had been
led by SS Obersturmführer Otto von Mallotke. Oskar kept no
dossier, but he was preparing for another era when he would
make a full report to either Canaris or the world. It would be
made earlier than he expected." (pp. 134-5) In the book, the
importance of what Oskar sees in the ghetto is that he is
preparing to use the material he observes as historical
evidence for the subsequent convictions of the perpetrators of
murder.27
In fact, Oskar Schindler was an important war crimes
witness.
"And he proved useful to the American authorities, and brought
a heap of dangerous hostility upon his own head, by presenting
the occupying power with the most detailed documentation on
all his old drinking companions, on the viscious owners of the
other slave factories that had stood near his, on all the
rotten group he had wined and flattered while inwardly
loathing in order to save the lives of helpless people."28
This is ironic. Oskar Schindler, who lived to be a
witness to history against the Nazis, is given an enormous
boost towards general immortality by an author who claims to
be an historian, but who reconstructs that history with
interpretations and explanatiopns that seem to betray, to some
degree, that history.
In the postmodernist version, the explanation is simply
that all historical reconstruction is creative. "All writing,
all composition, is construction. We do not imitate the world,
we construct versions of it. There is no mimesis, only poesis.
No recording. Only construction."29 Put another way, "the
truths of the Holocaust--both the factual and interpretive--
can no longer be said to lie beyond our understanding, but
must now be seen to inhere in the ways we understand,
interpret, and write its history."30
One, however, need not go that far. Historiographical
accounts may be judged in terms of their completeness,
consistency, plausibility, evidential support, interpretive
projections, erroneous explanations, etc. Further, the
intellectual frame for undertaking the construction will tell
us a great deal about the design and interpretation of the
events. And Keneally's interpretation was focused on the
problem of portraying virtue. He could not revert to the
romantic hero modelled on Rousseau's portrait of himself as
naturally good and well intentioned. For Keneally makes it
clear that Schindler neither purported nor could be mistaken
in any way for possessing such a virtue. Rousseau in his
Confessions claimed an "utter inability to hate or injure".
Schindler nowhere invokes such virtue nor provides any self-
justification for his black marketeering, his use of slave
labour, his drinking and womanizing based on the
exceptionality of his circumstances. Keneally makes clear that
Oskar neither possessed nor professed conventional virtues.
For this is the story of the pragmatic triumph of
good over evil, a triumph in eminently measurable,
statistical, unsubtle terms. When you work from the
other end of the beast - when you chronicle the
predictable and measurable success evil generally
achieves - it is easy to be wise, wry, piercing, to
avoid bathos. It is easy to show the inevitability
by which evil acquires all of what you would call
the real estate of the story, even though good might
finish up with a few imponderables like dignity and
self-knowledge. Fatal human malice is the staple of
narrators, original sin the mother-fluid of
historians. But it is a risky enterprise to have to
write of virtue. (p. 14)
Keneally was faced with a problem. He was writing in the
midst of an evolutionary imaginative world in which his
readers already brought to new imaginative reconstructions
their own ready-made experiences and expectations provided by
Keneally's predecessors. He was writing about virtue and not
original sin; modern readers are skeptical of virtue.
Keneally had a pragmatic problem. How could he make an
act of such great virtue plausible. Further, how could he do
so without endorsing a doctrine of the inevitability of evil
which others used to write about the dramatic fight betweeen
these old opponents?
Who else has written about such a lofty theme in the
twentieth century? To whom is Keneally comparing himself? For
what author does evil prevail even if good achieves a few
imponderables like dignity and self-knowledge? The reference
to original sin offers a clue. Is Keneally thinking of the
seedy world of Graham Greene? In The Last American, at the end
of the novel, the character Fowler reflects on his memory of
Pyle through whose death Fowler achieved a small measure of
redemption. "Everything had gone right with me since he had
died, but how I wished there existed someone to whom I could
say that I was sorry." As one critic summarized Fowler's
state, "what has mattered in Fowler's story is that he is
capable of feeling this pity and sorrow for the lost young
man; that as an ordinary, nonpolitical, moderately selfish,
but intelligent human being he is moved to act against
violence and stupidity; and that he is impelled towards such
action above all by his insight into human suffering,
especially the suffering caused by war and political
conflict."31
This suggests why Keneally sees his task as difficult. He
cannot rely on the literary device of irony to provide a sense
of distance from the action, for Schindler is not moderately
selfish, but excessively so. And when he moves to act against
violence and stupidity, he succeeds. According to Keneally,
Oskar's success does not seem to result from some metaphysical
or theological insight into suffering produced by war and
conflict. Keneally is writing about a selfish man who lacks
any special understanding of either pain or evil, a man who
achieves a tremendous victory over the forces of evil, while
the characters in a plethora of novels that have (literally)
informed our imaginative intelligence have failed to achieve
such a victory. How is Keneally going to establish credibility
about his account of Oskar Schindler?
To put it another way, in an era when the anti-hero is
king in literature, how does a novelist write about a hero
without appearing maudlin? How can the author convey a sense
of dramatic intensity that the subject deserves without making
the whole affair seem implausible? Unlike Fowler, who is full
of moral intelligence but is totally indecisive, Schindler is
extremely decisive but with no special entrée into the world
of moral wisdom. Like Pyle, Oskar is courageous, but he is not
ineffectual; Oskar has street smarts. Rehabilitation in Graham
Greene's The Power and the Glory is slow and secret; in the
novel by Keneally, there is no rehabilitation.32 There is no
original sin, just human failings.
We are entering the same Manichaean worldview Graham
Greene held, but without the Jansenist premise of original sin
and the power of evil to embrace us all.
The Holocaust has become the principal metaphor for
evil in our time, and like all metaphors it risks
devaluation by constant use and occasional
rhetorical abuse. By telling Oskar Schindler's story
the way he does - with names, dates and anecdotes
supplied by survivors - Thomas Keneally renews the
metaphor in the only way possible, by locating it
again in concrete, imaginable situations where
certain individuals make choices and others suffer
consequences, where evil is as palpable as the
presence of a madman with a gun or a bureaucrat with
a list.33
Palpable, not metaphysical evil. The victims are salvage.
The Holocaust is but a depiction of a few years of history.
Concrete space and time. Keneally left the priesthood and,
like Oskar, is a lapsed Catholic. For him, evil is the stuff
of everyday life. The contest is real enough, even if the
might of evil's power has been greatly reduced.
When Keneally refers to the "inevitability of evil"34,
perhaps the comparison is to be made to Joseph Conrad who was
one of the pioneers of the anti-heroic leading character in
quest of his soul in a dark, dark world. But for Conrad,
"there is a fundamental incompatibility between material
interest pursued by self-seeking individuals and common human
needs."35 Schindler, as a character who was victorious over
evil, just does not fit into this imaginative frame. Can you
think of one literary work or film in which the hero is a
businessman? And this is heroism on a most magnificent scale.
Consider how hard it is to write convincing prose about a hero
who is introduced as a man determined to make money.
Imagination is determined by our experience and education. We
cannot leave them behind and then pretend we are omniscient.
They influence what we expect and what we will accept as
plausible. By what means does Keneally make a virtous hero out
of a man in pursit of wealth?
The conundrum is that none of the imaginative frames that
we, Keneally's readers, bring to the novel, allow for the
existence of such a character. This is Keneally's difficulty.
He has to make such an account convincing. Providing the
appearance of historical authenticity was critical to
establishing that plausibility. Keneally's novel
overwhelmingly succeeds in creating that sense of reality even
if his descriptions, characterizations of the Holocaust,
explanation for it, and intellectual frame for understanding
the Holocaust have little to do with history itself. The
appearance of historical reality, however, is not a sufficient
condition for making his account of a virtous hero convincing.
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